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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: To investigate components of the 
rapidly increasing trend in hospital spending in 
the 2000’s and their relationship to market struc- 
ture. Study Design: Aggregate time series and 
multivariate analysis are conducted to test whe- 
ther hospital spending growth is driven by price 
or quantity and how recent hospital spending 
growth is related to health plan and hospital 
market structure. Method: Hospitals are grouped 
into strong and weak competitive markets based 
on the relative concentration of hospital and 
health plan markets as well as managed care 
penetration. Results: Inflation adjusted hospital 
spending grew much faster than gross domestic 
product (GDP) throughout the 2000s. Regres- 
sion results show that rapid growth was ob- 
served across all hospital markets—even in those 
markets where price competitive market forces 
are the strongest and that rising hospital 
prices, and not utilization explain most of the 
increases in hospital spending. Conclusions: Hos- 
pital spending exceeded the consumer price in- 
dex (CPI) by a substantial margin in the 2000’s 
due in part to weakening competitive market 
forces, which had a dampening effect on spend- 
ing and especially prices. Unless competition is 
restored, the cost of health care for consumers, 
employers and public payers can be expected to 
increase. 
 
Keywords: Hospital Spending; Prices; Utilization; 
Competitive Markets 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent health reform legislation includes mandates 
and government subsidies to extend health insurance 
coverage but relies on existing regulatory and market- 
based approaches to control future health care spending. 
While competitive market forces in health care have been 
widely studied [1-3], empirical research covering the 
evolving markets in the 2000s is limited and conflicting 
[4-7]. For example, with consumers’ switching from 
HMOs to less restrictive PPO plans and HMOs easing 
restrictions on utilization of health care services, initial 
reports cited an expected increase in utilization as the 
major driving factor behind increased health spending [8]. 
In contrast, recent trade journals and reports have used 
aggregated data to highlight the role of high prices as 
potential driver of increased spending in 2008-2011 in 
selected markets [9-15]. 
In this paper, we use data from all acute care hospitals 
in the US for the period 2001 through 2009 to document 
hospital spending patterns under existing and evolving 
market conditions as a guide to what we might expect in 
the future as health reform is implemented over time, 
particularly in light of the emerging trend of physician- 
hospital consolidation into integrated systems or ac- 
countable care organizations. We then use data for 2001 
through 2007 to conduct multivariate regression analysis 
to decompose per capita hospital spending growth into 
quantity and price trends and assess how these two com- 
ponents have grown over time as a function of three in-
ter-related hospital market structure dimensions: man- 
aged care (MC) penetration, MC plan concentration, and 
hospital market competition. 
2. METHODS 
The study design combines analysis of aggregate time- 
series data 2001-2009 along with a multivariate regres- 
sion analysis of changes between 2001 and 2007 in total 
per capita hospital net patient revenue across Metropoli- 
tan Statistical Areas (MSA), decomposed into price and 
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quantity components. Key dimensions of the competitive 
structure of hospital operating environments are meas- 
ured by interacting MC penetration, MC plan and hospi- 
tal concentration as described below. HMO and PPO 
enrollment are combined within an MSA to calculate MC 
penetration and MC concentration measures. 
2.1. Dependent Variables 
We analyze 3 outcome variables: 1) total net patient 
revenue per capita; 2) total adjusted hospital days per 
capita; and 3) net patient revenue per adjusted day. Total 
hospital net revenue is a product of revenue (price) per 
unit of service times the quantity of services. Hospital 
quantity is measured by adjusted patient days as calcu- 
lated by American Hospital Association (AHA) to cap- 
ture total hospital volume including both inpatient and 
outpatient utilization. Price is measured by dividing total 
net patient revenue by total adjusted patient days. As 
MSA is the unit of analysis, individual hospital net pa- 
tient revenue is first summed to the MSA level (using 
hospital staffed beds as weights) and then divided by 
MSA population to obtain a per capita value. Nominal 
total net patient revenue, calculated as total revenues 
minus discounts and contractual allowances, is deflated 
to real 2001 dollars using the CPI. Center of Medicare 
and Medicaid Services local wage index is used to adjust 
net patient revenue for geographic differences in input 
costs1. 
2.2. Independent Variables 
Competitive Market Categories. MSAs are divided 
into one of the 5 categories: strongest, strong, average, 
weak, and weakest markets based on the hospital bar- 
gaining and selective contracting literature. A large con- 
centrated health plan (buyer) is better able to extract 
volume discount [16]. At the same time, the competition 
between hospitals (sellers) enhances a plan’s ability to 
credibly threaten to exclude a provider from its preferred 
network (HMO or PPO) [17,18]. Research has also 
shown that managed care penetration is an important 
measure of health plans’ ability to control hospital utili- 
zation and spending [19,20]. Therefore, our approach 
combines the three dimensions of the competitive market 
structure in the health insurance and hospital markets. 
The “strongest” markets are where we expect health 
plans have the strongest bargaining power in the insurer- 
hospital negotiations, measured as high MC penetration 
and high MC concentration, while facing limited hospital 
market power, measured as low hospital concentration. 
We hypothesize that the effect of concentrated health 
plan market power will be bigger in high MC penetration 
than in low MC penetration areas. Therefore, we define 
the “strong” markets so that the difference between the 
“strongest” and “strong” markets represents the effect of 
concentrated health plan in high MC penetration areas. 
The “strong” markets are thus MSAs with high MC 
penetration, low MC concentration and low hospital con- 
centration. Conversely, the “weakest” markets have nar- 
row degree of health plan market power (low MC pene- 
tration and concentration) and strong hospital market 
power (high hospital concentration). A “weak” market is 
similar to that of the “weakest” except that MC concen- 
tration is high, and thus difference between the “weak” 
and “weakest” markets is the effect of concentrated 
health plan in low MC penetration areas. All other mar- 
kets are grouped into the “average” markets category. 
The threshold for “high” and “low” markets in each meas- 
ure is 50 percentile (results are not sensitive to mar- 
ginal changes in the threshold) based on the average of 
2001-2004/7 data to reflect the average market condition 
during the study period. Market concentration is meas- 
ured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in a MSA. 
2.3. Control Variables 
The first-difference model controls for time invariant 
MSA characteristics that are correlated with hospital net 
patient revenue and utilization. Additionally, we control 
for other characteristics that may change over time, in- 
cluding: changes in patient severity as measured by Me- 
dicare case-mix index, per capita income, unemployment 
rate, and percent population that are elderly in each MSA 
in each year. Further, as our focus is the relationship be- 
tween market forces and hospital spending, we control 
for the portion of hospital spending that are not influenced 
by market forces, i.e. the (change in) percent of total hospi- 
tal revenues paid by Medicaid and Medicare within each 
state (payer data are not available at the MSA level). 
3. DATA SOURCES 
Hospital characteristics, utilization and net patient 
revenue come from American Hospital Association An- 
nual Surveys and Medicare hospital cost reports. Man- 
aged care penetration and MC concentration measures 
are compiled from MSA level HMO and PPO enrollment 
data from Inter-study (2001 and 2004) and are supple- 
mented by the Area Resource File and the PPS Impact 
file (for MSA characteristics such as the area wage index, 
per capita income, unemployment rate, and population 
structure). Hospital system measures follow Madison and 
Chakravarty [21,22]. We report overall trend in hospital 
spending and utilization between 2001 and 2009 (the 
most recent data available) for all general acute hospitals 
1We scale up the values from hospitals that are observed in cost reports 
to the total possible universe of number of hospitals in a MSA, where 
the “possible number” of universe of hospitals” is the total number of 
hospitals that reporting to AHA each year. 
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that operate continuously in MSAs in that period. For the 
regression analysis, we limit to 2001-2007 just prior to 
the recent recession because spending and utilization 
patterns might be different under economic contraction 
and our managed care data is available only up to 2004. 
Outliers were removed based on the top and bottom 1% 
of three key variables—net patient revenue, adjusted 
days, and price (average revenue per adjusted day)—the 
final regression sample covers 2085 hospitals in 282 
MSAs in both years (representing 95% of all urban hos- 
pital spending in the US). 
grew very little during the period—a total of only 9 per- 
cent, compared to the strong 42% growth in real net pa- 
tient revenue, suggesting that much of the growth in total 
hospital spending is related to higher revenue per ad- 
justed day. In fact, the gap between the growth in net 
patient revenue and adjusted day—representing revenue 
per day—has been increasing throughout the whole 
2001-2009 period, even during recession 2008-2009. 
Table 1 presents the results of the multivariate analy- 
sis designed to explore whether per capita hospital spend- 
ing patterns grew differently for hospitals operating in 
markets with different degrees of competitive pressure. 
The rows in Table 1 present regression-adjusted cumula- 
tive growth in per capita total net patient revenue (real), 
total adjusted days and average revenue per adjusted day 
(real), respectively. 
4. RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows that per capita hospital spending 
(nominal) grew well above the CPI over the 2001-2009 
period—64% vs. 21%. On an annual basis, hospital 
spending increased by an average of 6% per year while 
the CPI grew 2% annually—a growth difference of 4 
percentage points annually. With the reported weakening 
of managed care we expected a surge in hospital utiliza- 
tion, which would explain much of the increase in per 
capita hospital spending. Figure 2 presents trend data for 
total net patient revenue per capita and utilization (ad- 
justed patient days) per capita. Surprisingly, utilization 
By looking across the columns one can observe the 
differential relationship between market competitive 
market pressure and growth rates. Between 2001 and 
2007, cumulative per capita spending was slowest in the 
strongest markets (26%) and greatest in the weakest 
markets (37%). The quantity and price regressions show 
a similar pattern of slowest growth in strongest markets. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative growth in nominal hospital net revenue per capita compared to consumer price index (CPI), 2001 to 2009. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative growth in real hospital net revenue and quantity, 2001 to 2009. 
 
Table 1. Regression adjusted growth by strength of market competition. 
 Strongest Markets Strong Markets Average Markets Weak Markets Weakest Markets 
Cumulative Growth  
between 2001 and 2007 
High MC Concentration 
within Strong Markets 
Low MC Concentration 
within Strong Markets 
All Other  
Areas 
High MC Concentration 
within Weak Markets 
Low MC Concentration 
within Weak Markets 
Net Patient Revenue (Real) 26%** 33%** 30%** 35%** 37%** 
Adjusted Patient Days 7% 8% 10%* 10% 14%** 
Net Patient Rev per Day 16%** 21%** 18%** 21%** 22%** 
Note: 1) Strong markets are defined as MSAs high MC penetration, and high hospital competition (above 50 percentile in their distributions); 2) Weak markets 
are defined as MSAs high MC penetration, and high hospital competition (below 50 percentile in their distributions); 3) Regression models include dum- 
mies for each markets, change in percent total hospital spending by Medicare in a state, change in percent total hospital spending by Medicaid in a state, 
change in case-mix index, change in unemployment rate, and change in percent population that is >65; ** Indicates significance level at 0.05 and * at 0.1 
in the regressions. 
 
strongest markets than in the weakest markets, and the 
difference is 6 percentage points in net revenue per ad- 
justed day, respectively. Comparison across rows within 
each column provides the relative contribution of price 
and quantity to total growth. Price increases drive total 
net patient revenue growth across all markets. Price grew 
2.3 times faster than quantity in the strongest markets 
(16%/7% = 2.3) and 2.6 times in the strong markets 
(21%/8% = 2.6). 
5. DISCUSSION 
Research has shown that historically greater MC pene- 
tration coupled with more competitive hospital markets 
placed downward pressure in total hospital spending, 
operating mostly through lower prices. In this study we 
add a third potential source of market pressure, MC plan 
(HMO + PPO) concentration interacted with MC pene- 
tration and hospital competition. 
The results paint a picture of market forces losing their 
punch, especially with respect to controlling price in- 
creases. Even in the strongest markets where the com- 
bined pressure from high MC penetration, hospital com- 
petition and health plan concentration is greatest, per 
capita hospital spending grew much faster than inflation 
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and GDP growth (1.3 percentage points above real GDP 
growth of 2.7 in 2001-2007, authors’ calculation). In 
those markets with less competitive pressure, spending 
grew even faster. 
Decomposition of total spending provides some sur- 
prising results. We find, contrary to expectations, hospi- 
tal utilization did not surge during the study period (3 - 8 
percent based on alternative measures). Our finding adds 
to several recent reports, which found sharply rising hos- 
pital prices between 2008 and 2011 [9-15], indicating 
that rising hospital prices is not a recent or short-term 
phenomenon. Rather, hospital prices have been rising ra- 
pidly and driving hospital spending throughout the 2000’s. 
While we cannot study them directly, we offer several 
possible explanations. Per capita demand for hospital ser- 
vices may be affected by new medical technology that 
reduces the need for some hospitalizations and length of 
stay. Also, MC plans, while relaxing direct utilization 
controls also increased cost sharing and case manage- 
ment programs while hospital bed capacity was relatively 
fixed, in part by nursing shortages. 
Another key finding pertains to emerging trend of 
price increases in explaining per capita hospital spending. 
We found that much of the spending growth is due to 
higher revenue per unit of output, regardless of strength 
of market. Even in the strongest markets, price rose more 
than twice as fast as utilization. The trend that price is 
now driving total spending is in contrast to studies in the 
1990’s that found MC lowered overall expenditure pri- 
marily by price discount [23]. While our data do not al- 
low us to test the underlying causes of this price driven 
trend, we offer some possibilities. The price bargaining 
position of health plans has weakened vis-à-vis hospitals 
[24-27]. Changes in treatment intensity and/ or technol- 
ogy can increase the spending per unit of hospital output. 
Also, improved quality may play a role resulting from 
new public and private quality improvement initiatives 
(e.g., report cards, pay-for-performance). Clearly, further 
research is needed to test these and other hypotheses. 
Given our data, we are unable to address the intensity, 
quality, and other issues directly. 
6. CONCLUSION 
With health reform bringing tens of millions of people 
into the health care system, rapidly rising health spend- 
ing remains a pressing economic issue of our time. The 
reform law relies in part on market forces to control fu- 
ture spending for the newly insured population. Our re- 
sults show that spending on hospital care grew by a sub- 
stantial margin above CPI during the 2000’s and that this 
trend is driven by a new and troubling factor—rapidly 
rising hospital prices. Even in markets where competitive 
forces are the strongest, hospital price increases made up 
nearly two thirds of the increase in total per capita 
spending. Our findings suggest that the US health care 
market has lost the competitive vigor needed to keep 
downward pressure on prices. Greater attention and ef- 
forts are needed in both the public and private sectors to 
restore price competition. Antitrust agencies should move 
more aggressively to protect and restore price competi- 
tion. Private sector innovation is needed to increase con- 
sumer price shopping both in the insurance markets and 
for medical care services. If competitive balance is not 
restored soon, we face the prospect of higher health care 
prices, increased health insurance premiums and a grow- 
ing call for greater government regulation. 
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